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The Politics of Exclusionary Zoning & the Pathology That Led to the Collapse of New
Jersey’s Mount Laurel Mandate
By Kristin Rempusheski
Part I: Introduction
On March 10, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court disbanded the Council on Affordable
Housing (COAH)1 in In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5.97 by the New Jersey Council on
Affordable Housing, what is now being deemed Mount Laurel IV.2 As a consequence, specially
assigned judges now have jurisdiction over all affordable housing litigation.3 In 1975, the Mount
Laurel sequence of cases began when the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated “exclusionary
zoning,” which meant that municipalities could no longer use local zoning ordinances to
effectively exclude people of low to moderate incomes from communities.4 In doing so, the
remarkable decision expressly mandated municipalities to provide a “realistic opportunity” of
affordable housing to all people.5 However, when the Mount Laurel mandate was widely ignored
by municipalities, the court again heard the issue in what was coined Mount Laurel II.6 There, the
court established a procedure by which three specially selected judges would hear all Mount Laurel
litigation, and established strict enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance.7

This

revolutionary decision opened the floodgates to litigation, and the New Jersey legislature
responded by enacting the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to keep the courts out of the business of
enforcing housing obligations.8

1

COAH was created in 1985 by the Fair Housing Act.
221 N.J. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Mount Laurel IV].
3
See id.
4
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I].
5
Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 173-75.
6
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158 (1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel
II].
7
Id. at 253-54; 85-86.
8
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2013).
2

2

As an alternative for supervision, the Act created COAH, an agency that was granted broad
authority to oversee all affordable housing obligations.9 While this angered housing advocates
who foresaw future noncompliance as a result of defects in the new system, the Court upheld the
FHA and its companion agency in what was termed Mount Laurel III, and jurisdiction over all
Mount Laurel litigation was transferred to the Council.10 However, in the years to follow, COAH’s
own flaws became apparent, and a lack of political consensus regarding the Mount Laurel mandate
enabled abrogation of the constitutional mandate at the local level. The lack of unanimity amongst
the branches of government essentially allowed municipalities to escape their fair share housing
obligations, through delays and other devices. Thus, just like in Mount Laurel II, this ultimately
led the court to re-enter the scene and assume jurisdiction over all affordable housing litigation.
Once again, an opening of the floodgates has ensued.
This Note will argue that until the other branches of government can devise an effective
system to enforce the Mount Laurel mandate, it is necessary for the judicial branch to compel
compliance with affordable housing obligations. In doing so, it proceeds in four parts. Part II
provides a synopsis of the reasoning and background behind the Mount Laurel doctrine, as well as
the enactment of the FHA and COAH. Part III then explains how COAH’s own shortcomings, in
conjunction with a lack of political consensus regarding the Mount Laurel mandate, ultimately
allowed for inconsistencies amongst the three branches of state government. It will illustrate how
these inconsistencies ultimately led to judicial intervention, resulting in the recent Mount Laurel
IV decision. Finally, Part IV provides an explanation of why the Mount Laurel IV decision was
necessary. In doing so, it describes how the feeble administrative process and lack of political

9

Id. § 52:27D-329.2(a).
Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 43 (1986) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III].

10
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consensus regarding the Mount Laurel mandate enabled municipalities to ignore the Mount Laurel
mandate through delays and other tactics in the absence of court orders requiring compliance.
Furthermore, it describes how allowing the judiciary to have jurisdiction over affordable housing
issues in the first instance has already expedited reform for affordable housing accommodations.
Part II: Background
Historically, the law has made exclusionary conduct in the housing context possible.11
Until the 1940s, private exclusion was legally accepted to allow for patterns of segregation and
housing discrimination.12 Even mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration
contained racial restrictions.13 Discernibly, these outright restrictions were eventually ruled
unconstitutional.14 However, localities have the “sovereign power to regulate land use as they see
fit,” which enables institutional discrimination to endure through less ostensible means.15 For
example, municipalities effectively exclude others by offering little dwelling units for affordable
to low-income people. 16 They also do so “by using local land-use regulatory ordinances that raise
the cost of other housing beyond their [low income people’s] reach.”17 Laws can be a proxy for
substantial barriers, for example, through “minimum lot and room sizes, setback rules, and
discretionary procedures for multifamily developments.”18

11

CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES, 8 (1996).
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.; Noelle Van Baaren, The Persistence of Exclusionary Zoning, RUTGERS CTR. FOR LAW IN METROPOLITAN
EQUITY (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.clime.newark.rutgers.edu/publications/article/persistence-exclusionary-zoning.
17
HAAR, supra note 11, at 8.
18
Id.; see also Van Baaren, supra note 16 (explaining how local zoning ordinance limit the supply of housing to
increase the municipality’s desirability and raise the price of residential accesses to the area. Van Baaren explains
local governments’ objectives as follows: “Through this practice, municipal governments are able to accomplish two
distinct but interrelated objectives: (1) they can take advantage of the benefits of regional development without
having to bear the burdens of such development; and (2) they can maintain themselves as enclaves of affluence.”).
12
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Nevertheless, markedly, in 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the practice
of exclusionary zoning in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
(Mount Laurel I).19 The revolutionary decision declared that every “developing municipality” has
a state constitutional obligation under both substantive due process and equal protection, in
addition to the state’s inherent police powers, to provide a realistic opportunity to afford housing
for all people.20

Accordingly, it set the precedent that developing municipalities have an

affirmative duty to provide for their “fair share of the regional need for low and moderate income
housing.”21
Though innovative, Mount Laurel I did not develop remedies or guidelines to implement
its mandate.

Rather, it relied on voluntary municipal compliance, reasoning that, “[t]he

municipality should first have full opportunity to itself act without judicial supervision.”22 Yet, it
notably encouraged the state legislature to aid in preventing exclusionary zoning at the local level
by authorizing regional zoning, or at least regulation of those land use ordinances with a substantial
impact by an agency beyond the local municipality. 23
Despite the court’s groundbreaking decision, local municipalities largely ignored the
mandate.24 Its lack of enforcement procedures led to little change.25 Thus, the New Jersey

19

Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 173-75. The decision resulted from a lawsuit brought by the Southern Burlington
County NAACP on behalf of low-income African-American residents of Mount Laurel Township, who were not
afforded the opportunity to build decent housing to replace the run-down homes in which they lived.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 192.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 189 & n.22.
24
Henry L. Kent-Smith, The Council on Affordable Housing and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Will the Council
Succeed? 18 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 933 (1987). (“Overall, the supreme court’s reliance on goodwill efforts and
voluntary compliance meant no low cost housing.”).
25
See id. at 953 (“Prior to the Mount Laurel II decision, little legislative action was taken towards effectuating the
constitutional obligation set forth in the original Mount Laurel decision. In fact, some of the earliest legislative
actions were proposed constitutional amendments to overrule this decision. These amendments redefined the Article
I guarantees making them inapplicable to land use ordinances which may have indirect economic effects on low and
moderate income housing opportunities.”); Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey Supreme Court’s
Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30, 32 (1988) (“While hailed as a case which could transform land-use

5

Supreme Court consolidated six cases concerning the issues surrounding the Mount Laurel
Doctrine into a trial that resulted in what has been coined Mount Laurel II.26 In Mount Laurel II,
aggravated by “widespread non-compliance,” the court expressly reaffirmed Mount Laurel I and
authorized substantial remedies to “put some steel into [the Mount Laurel] doctrine.”27
Particularly, instead of applying the doctrine to “developing” municipalities as it did in Mount
Laurel I, the Court adopted the State Development Guide Plan as a method of discerning “growth
areas” where the Mount Laurel mandate would apply.28 Furthermore, in an effort to promote a
consistent and expedited system, it established a procedure by which three specially selected
judges would hear all future Mount Laurel litigation.29 The judges would assess “fair share” for
their regions, oversee challenges and development, and have the authority to invoke enforcement
measures for noncompliant municipalities.30 Significantly, the court also approved a “builder’s
remedy,” in which developers could receive direct approval from the court to build developments
that included a reasonable share of affordable housing, if they successfully sued the municipalities
with exclusionary zoning ordinances that rejected the developments.31
In adopting these extensive remedial measures, the court noted that while it prefers
legislative to judicial action in the field, the inaction of the legislative and executive branches
essentially left it no choice but to “give meaning to the constitutional doctrine” through its “own
devices.”32 In other words, if the legislative body would not take action to enforce constitutional

law, eight years later little had changed.”); Alan Mallach, From Mount Laurel to Molehill: Blueprint for Delay, 15
N.J. REP. 21 (Oct. 1985) (“Looking back in 1983, eight years after the original [Mount Laurel] decision, it seemed
clear that little lower-income housing had actually been built as a result of the Mount Laurel ruling, and not a single
unit in Mount Laurel Township itself.”).
26
Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 158.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 158.
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rights, the judiciary would. The fact that the legislature could not reach accord to devise an
effective enforcement mechanism was no longer an excuse.33
The court’s controversial decision mustered up both praise and resistance, generated over
one hundred lawsuits, and most significantly, prompted the executive and legislative branches to
act.34 In 1985, in order to preserve municipal home rule and to keep the judiciary away from
implementing the Mount Laurel mandate, the legislature enacted the Fair Housing Act.35 The FHA
created a state agency, known as the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), which was granted
broad authority to assess and determine affordable housing obligations.36 Its purpose was to serve
as “an optional administrative alternative to litigating constitutional compliance through civil
exclusionary zoning actions.”37
COAH would be required to: (1) enact regulations that establish and update statewide
affordable housing need; (2) assign each municipality an affordable housing obligation for its

Id. (explaining that the court’s intervention was attributable in part to “the enormous difficulty of achieving a
political consensus that might lead to significant legislation enforcing the constitutional mandate better than [the
court] can, legislation that might completely remove [the court] from those controversies.”); see also Paula A.
Franzese, Mount Laurel and the Fair Housing Act: Success or Failure? 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 59, 67-68 (1991)
(“Recognizing that the sore absence of political consensus posed a formidable obstacle to the passage of responsive
legislation, the court concluded that enforcement of the constitutional rights at stake could not await a supporting
popular concordance.”).
34
Corey Klein, Re-Examining the Mount Laurel Doctrine After the Demise of the Council on Affordable Housing: A
Critique of the Builder’s Remedy and Voluntary Municipal Compliance, SETON HALL L. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP
PAPER, 1, 7 (2012), http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/123; see also Thomas Daniel McCloskey,
Animal House Re-Lived: A Depiction of New Jersey’s Current Affordable Housing Landscape, IN THE ZONE (Feb.
2009), http://www.foxrothschild.com/content/uploads/2015/05/inthezone_feb09_animalhouse.pdf. (“A rash of such
suits were brought in the wake of Mt. Laurel II, prompting fears by municipalities that the courts would be dictating
to them how and where residential developments (with and without affordable housing) would be implemented.”)
35
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2013); Kent-Smith, supra note 24, at 937 & n.62 (“The concept of
municipal Home Rule directly opposes the regional fair share allocation of low and moderate income housing. The
term Home Rule originates from the Home Rule Act of 1917 . . . This act gave municipalities broad powers ‘over the
internal affairs of such municipalities for local government.’”); McCloskey, supra note 34 (“Tensions immediately
fomented and reached a feverish pitch between and among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of
government over who was the more responsible, and equipped, agency of government to socially engineer housing
policy and implement construction state-wide.”)
36
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-307, -308; see also Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 4.
37
Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 4.
33
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designated region; and (3) identify the delivery techniques available to municipalities in addressing
the assigned obligation.38 Of critical importance was COAH’s ability to assess a municipality’s
fair share plan and housing element, and accordingly, grant or deny “substantive certification.”39
In order to reward municipal compliance, the FHA protected towns that received substantive
certification by granting a period during which the municipality’s implementing ordinances would
enjoy a presumption of validity in any ensuing exclusionary zoning litigation. 40 Furthermore, it
generated the “exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement,” which provided a period of
immunity from lawsuits to towns participating in the administrative process for demonstrating
constitutional compliance.41
Despite criticism that the new Act institutionalized delay and did not provide enough
recourse, in Mount Laurel III, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Fair Housing Act.42 While recognizing that the attack on the statute was substantial, the court
dismissed it as pure speculation, and conveyed its preference for legislative action.43 It afforded
the Legislature great deference, reasoning, “that a law is presumed to be constitutional” and found
that any inadequacy with respect to the Council “must be close to a certainty” to be deemed
unconstitutional.44 Moreover, the court clarified that in the earlier Mount Laurel cases, it was not
sheer delays alone that necessitated judicial intervention, but rather, “the total disregard by
municipalities of the judiciary’s attempts to enforce the obligation, and the interminable delay
where litigation was in process.”45 The unanimous decision thus transferred jurisdiction of all

38

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307 to -308; 313 to -317; see also Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 7-8.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 21; Kent-Smith, supra note 24, at 945; see also Franzese, supra note 25, at 40.
43
Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 43; Kent-Smith, supra note 24, at 945; see also Franzese, supra note 25, at 40.
44
Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 43-45.
45
Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 41. The Court also rejected the argument that the freeze on builder’s remedies was
part of the constitutional obligation. Id. at 42.
39
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pending litigation to the Council.46 However, the court warned that if the legislature failed to
accomplish its constitutional obligation, the judiciary would have no choice but to re-enter the
scene and assure constitutional compliance.47
The system established worked somewhat well through the year 2000.48 About half of
New Jersey’s local governments had submitted plans for COAH by the year 2001, and those, along
with an additional sixty-eight, had completed or were beginning construction of about 29,000 low
and moderate income housing units.49 Moreover, about 11,000 units were bought and occupied
by low and moderate income households at this time.50 However, COAH’s shortcomings quickly
proved the system ineffective, and a lack of political consensus regarding the mandate allowed, if
not enabled, local noncompliance.51 Inaction on the part of the legislative and executive branches
thus allowed history to repeat itself, and on March 10, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court
fulfilled its promise of Mount Laurel II and re-entered the affordable housing scene in what is now
deemed “Mount Laurel IV.”52 The unanimous decision rendered COAH “moribund,” and just like
in Mount Laurel II, transferred jurisdiction over Mount Laurel affordable housing issues to
specially selected judges as the first forum for redress.53 This has prompted the floodgates to open
with litigation.

46

Id. at 26.
Id. at 23 (noting, “If . . . the Act . . . achieves nothing but delay, the judiciary will be forced to resume its
appropriate role.” “[n]o one should assume that our exercise of comity today signals a weakening of our resolve to
enforce the constitutional rights of New Jersey’s lower income citizens.”).
48
Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63
RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851 (2011); see also Eamonn K. Bakewell, Foreclosure of a Dream: The Impact of the
Council on Affordable Housing’s New Regulations on the Constitutional Duty to Provide Affordable Housing in
New Jersey, 2 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 310, 313-14 & n.30 (2005).
49
Mallach, supra note 48, at 851.
50
Id.
51
Id.; Bakewell, supra note 48 at 316 (“Unfortunately, the regulations are rife with loopholes that would allow smart
municipalities to completely avoid their Mount Laurel obligations.”); Klein, supra note 34, at 17-18.
52
Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 1.
53
Id. at 5.
47
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Part III: Inaction and Lack of Political Consensus Leads to Judicial Intervention
In 2015, the judiciary was ultimately forced to re-enter the fray and render COAH
“moribund” as a direct result of not only COAH’s own flaws, but a lack of political accord that
ultimately facilitated abrogation of the Mount Laurel mandate at the local level.54 Despite
COAH’s initial successes, embedded within the agency were loopholes that allowed townships to
avoid their affordable housing obligations.55 The legislative and executive branches of the State’s
government, however, simply did not address these shortcomings.56 Rather, clashing opinions
concerning the Mount Laurel Mandate at its very core funneled conflicting decisions made by
these branches.57 Ultimately, the same tensions amongst the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches that led to COAH’s creation also led to its demise, necessitating intense judicial
intervention all over again, thirty years later.
A. COAH’s Faults
The system set up by COAH ultimately had its own faults that necessitated judicial
intervention. In 1987, the Council first adopted specific rules for determining a municipality’s
affordable housing obligation known as the First Round Rules.58 In 1993, the Second Round Rules
were adopted, which were similar to the first, but took into account changes in census data.59 The
rules “applied a complex formula that took into account vacant land area, employment growth,
and income distribution to come up with a firm, and sometimes seemingly highly arbitrary number
for each municipality.”60 While the criteria set out by COAH was inherently designed to address

54

Id.
Id.; see also Bakewell, supra note 48, at 321-22; see also Klein, supra note 34, at 17-18.
56
See generally Mallach, supra note 48.
57
Id.
58
See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 2007); see also Klein, supra note
34, at 8.
59
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 25.; see also Klein, supra note 34, at 8.
60
Mallach, supra note 48 at 850-51. See also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 25.
55
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a municipality’s need for affordable housing, the rules had various “loopholes” that prevented
inclusion.61
Particularly, under the rules, municipalities could reduce the number of affordable housing
units they were required to provide through the use of “credits.”62 In addition, up to twenty-five
percent of a municipality’s required affordable housing could be satisfied through age-restrictive
affordable housing.63 Moreover, communities could make use of a “Regional Contribution
Agreement” (RCA) in which they could transfer up to fifty percent of their fair share to another
community within the region through an agreement.64 Essentially, with an RCA, municipalities
were “sending communities and receiving communities.”65 Cash typically changed hands between
the sender and the receiver, with the sender being a suburban community and the receiver usually
an urban center.66
As time went on, as a result of these leniencies, many felt as though COAH became
increasingly bureaucratic and not as concerned about the housing needs of low-income people.67
Its amenability combined with inaction led to a downward spiral. 68 The promulgation of Third
Round Rules was due in 1999—however, when the Second Round Rules expired, COAH had not
proposed new regulations.69 By 2004, the Appellate Division stated that COAH’s delay frustrated

61

Bakewell, supra note 48, at 321-22; see also Klein, supra note 34, at 17-18.
N.J.A.C. 9:93-2.14, -3.2; see also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 25. (Explaining that
in particular, COAH permitted credits and adjustments to reduce a municipalities fair share for affordable housing
constructed between 1980 and 1986, for substantial compliance, and “for municipalities that lacked sufficient vacant
land or did not have access to water and sewer.”)
63
N.J.A.C. 5:93-5.15. In other words, by providing senior housing units could satisfy affordable housing
obligations. See also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 25.
64
N.J.S.A. § 52:27D-312. See also In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 23.
65
Franzese, supra note 33, at 72.
66
Id.
67
Mallach, supra note 48, at 851; see also Klein, supra note 34, at 17.
68
Id.
69
See 31 N.J.R. 1480 (June 7, 1999) (noting that second-round obligations expired on June 6, 1999); see also Mount
Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 8.
62
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the public policies embodied by the Mount Laurel cases.70 COAH finally adopted a set of Third
Round Rules on December 20, 2004, five years after the end of the previous round.71 In contrast
to the prior rules, the new rules relied upon a municipality’s “growth share,” as opposed to a fixed
obligation.72 This meant that municipalities had to provide affordable units “only to the extent that
market rate housing and non-residential growth took place.”73 The new methodology was highly
criticized for deterring municipalities from expanding, since under the new regulations, housing
obligations were determined by the amount of homes and jobs created.74 Moreover, the new rules
were scrutinized because they allowed one half of the affordable housing obligations to be satisfied
through RCAs and the other half through age-restrictive zoning.75
The flaws in COAH’s own rules were simply not addressed by the Council until the
judiciary was forced to enter the scene in 2007. Opposition from both developers and housing
advocates, along with the New Jersey Builders Association, brought suit to invalidate the Third
Round Rules.76 On January 25, 2007, the Appellate Division affirmed portions of COAH’s
proposed methodology, but invalidated other aspects of the Third Round Rules.77

These

invalidated aspects included the “growth share” principle and others methods by which COAH
reduced municipal housing obligations, on constitutional and other grounds.78

70

In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91, 372 N.J. Super. 61, 95-96, 855 A.2d 582 (App. Div. 2004), cert.
denied, 182 N.J. 630 (2005); see also Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 8.
71
Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 8.
72
Id. at 23. E.g., Bakewell, supra note 48 at 320-29 (providing a detailed description of the Third Round Rules).
73
Mallach, supra note 48 at 851.
74
Bakewell, supra note 48 at 320-21 (“There are both strong advocates and harsh critics of the New Third Round
Numbers. The criticisms focus on the fact that there are so many loopholes in the new third round numbers that
enable clever municipalities to effectively avoid the Mount Laurel obligation.").
75
Id. One major criticism of allowing age restrictive zoning to satisfy affordable housing obligations is that it
discriminates against low-income families with children. Id. at 323.
76
Id.
77
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. at 86-87.
78
Id. at 88. See also McCloskey, supra note 34 (stating that judicial intervention in the process invalidated COAH’s
third rounds “as having been, in material part, defective and trumped-up in such a way that, the Appellate Division
concluded, recklessly if not deliberately underestimated the affordable housing need state-wide and over-stated the
successes of municipal compliance with affordable housing obligations.”)
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Yet, the problematic rules remained for quite some time thereafter. Thus, efforts to truly
enforce the Mount Laurel mandate moved at a glacial pace. It was not until after the Appellate
Division granted COAH two extensions, that COAH promulgated revised rules in 2008.79 These
rules maintained a form of the “growth share” methodology, but removed many of the credits and
other concerns of the prior rules, and more than doubled the total local fair share obligation.80
However, the delay in their creation simply worsened the public’s perception of the Mount
Laurel’s mandate. Specifically, it frustrated those municipalities that already spent time and
money to meet the requirements of the prior rules in good faith, but now fell out of compliance.81
B. State Government Inaction & Lack of Political Consensus
Following the adoption of the revised Third Round Rules a slew of contradictory decisions
concerning the Mount Laurel mandate by both the executive and legislative branches followed.
Independent from COAH’s promulgation of its revised Third Round Rules that became effective
on June 2, 2008, and while COAH’s further amendments had been proposed, on July 17, 2008,
Governor Corzine enacted new COAH-reform legislation, P.L. 2008, c. 46, which updated the
prior Act.82 It was driven by Assembly Speaker Joe Roberts, who was newly elected at the time.83
The legislation amended the New Jersey Fair Housing Act.84 It added a new section to the
FHA known as the “State-wide Non-Residential Development Fee Act” and took effect
immediately upon its enactment by Governor Corzine on July 17, 2008.85 The Amendment also

79

N.J.R. 237(a) (Jan. 22, 2008); 40 N.J.R. 515(a) (Jan. 22, 2008); see also Mount Laurel IV, 221 N.J. at 8.
See Mallach, supra note 48, at 853.
81
Id.
82
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2; McCloskey, supra note 34 (describing the new Act, P.L. 2008, c. 46, which
“took the form of Assembly Bill 500/Senate Bill 1783 – more commonly known and referred to as the ‘Roberts’
Bill’ that had been passed by the State Assembly on June 16, 2008, and State Senate on June 23, 2008.”)
83
Mallach, supra note 48, at 854.
84
Id.
85
Id.
80
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abolished RCAs and made other changes to law concerning affordable housing.86 Particularly, it
provided that COAH may authorize a municipality to impose and collect development fees from
developers of residential property, but provided that the municipality may not spend or commit to
spend any of the fees without first obtaining COAH’s approval of the expenditure.87 Moreover, it
mandated COAH to promulgate regulations regarding the establishment, administration, and
enforcement of the expenditure of affordable housing development fees by municipalities.88
Of critical significance, the Amendment also added that any developer fees collected, but
not committed for expenditure within four years from the date of the collection, would be required
by the council to revert the remaining unspent balance at the end of the four-year period to the
state’s “New Jersey Affordable Housing Trust Fund,” to be used in the housing region of the
transferring municipality for the authorized purposes of that fund.89 Shortly thereafter, in 2008,
COAH’s then-Executive Director wrote to all New Jersey mayors explaining the provisions and
noting that COAH was authorized to promulgate regulations regarding the expenditure of
development fees in the municipal trust funds.90 However, this never transpired, despite the

86

Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(a) (stating first that COAH “may authorize a municipality that has petitioned
for substantive certification . . . to impose and collect development fees from developers of residential property” and
second, that “[a] municipality may not spend or commit to spend any affordable housing development fees . . .
without first obtaining [COAH’s] approval of the expenditure”); see also In re Failure of COAH to Adopt Trust
Fund Regulations, 440 N.J. Super. 220, 223 (App. Div. 2015) [hereinafter In re Failure of COAH].
88
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(d) (requiring COAH to “promulgate regulations regarding the establishment,
administration and enforcement of the expenditure of affordable housing development fees by municipalities”); see
also In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super at 223.
89
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(d) (providing that “[a] municipality that fails to commit to expend the balance
required in the development fee trust fund by the time set forth in this section shall be required by the council to
transfer the remaining unspent balance at the end of the four-year period to the ‘New Jersey Affordable Housing
Trust Fund,’ . . . to be used in the housing region of the transferring municipality for the authorized purposes of that
fund.)”; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-329.2(b) (declaring, in part “[a] municipality that fails to commit to expend the
amounts collected pursuant to this section within the timeframes established shall be required to transfer any
unexpended revenue collected pursuant to subsection a. of this section to the ‘New Jersey Affordable Housing Trust
Fund,’ . . . to be used within the same housing region for authorized purposes of that fund, in accordance with
regulations promulgated by the council”); see also In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super at 224.
90
In re Failure of COAH, 440 N.J. Super at 224.
87
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Amendment’s mandate that COAH do so.91 The inaction thus added to the uncertainty concerning
affordable housing obligations. Consequently, by this point, COAH’s credibility had begun to
decrease, as delays on the part of COAH continued to aggravate local governments.92
Moreover, in 2008, confusion further spiraled when Governor Corzine altered the
constitutional requirements of Mount Laurel, ignoring distinctions drawn by the Legislature in the
Highlands Act.93 Specifically, the Governor ratified the Highlands Regional Master Plan and
issued “Executive Order 114,” aimed at issues relating to the eighty-eight northern New Jersey
municipalities located in the Highlands region.94 Executive Order 114 “directed that COAH’s
calculations of affordable housing obligations of municipalities be adjusted downwards as
necessary to ensure consistency with the Highlands Regional Master Plan” even though the
Highlands Region, by statute, was already divided in to two distinct areas: the “Preservation Area”
and the “Planning Area.”95 The Governor’s mandate was officially implemented on November 4,
2008 and allowed conforming Highlands Region municipalities to have their “COAH Third Round
affordable housing regulations adjusted to ensure that the Regions’ water and other resources were
protected.”96
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While Governor Corzine’s Executive Order enabled protection of the Highlands Region’s
resources, it triggered the issuance of a “scare resource restraint” (“the restraint”) by COAH merely
one week later, which further rattled political accord with respect to affordable housing
obligations.97 The restraint effectively stopped all construction that did not include affordable
units in all Highlands towns under its control.98 It was deemed to apply even to those towns in the
Highlands Region “Planning Area,” where compliance with the Regional Master Plan is
voluntary.99 Therefore, the restraint had a significant effect on development efforts. Director of
the Sierra Club of the New Jersey, Jeff TiFittel, attempted to justify the wide sweeping restraint,
and stated that his organization supported the order, saying, “[w]e felt it would be the one way to
make sure the affordable housing got built, and the towns couldn't play games. . . . Without the
order, we worried that towns would approve luxury housing or box stores and say they had no
room left for affordable housing, leading developers to sue and threaten the environmental
protections of the Highlands Act.”100 In other words, the restraint was an attempt to prevent towns
from quickly constructing in areas with scarce room for development, to exploit Executive Order
114 and avert affordable housing obligations. However, the decision ultimately aggravated
political unanimity and led to greater delay in affordable housing efforts, since COAH arguably
did not provide proper legal notice nor comply with its own rules or procedures.101 The sentiment
was that COAH was essentially “shutting down the planning and zoning boards of the 72 affected
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Highlands Region towns for the next 4-5 years.”102 It was thus viewed as an unjustified means of
achieving nothing but deferral, and local governments’ aggravation with COAH intensified.103
As this controversy took place, municipalities continued to wait on COAH to provide a
framework for the expenditure of housing development fees. However, during the wait, legislation
to abolish COAH was introduced by the Republican minority in the New Jersey Legislature in
early 2009.104 By January 19, 2010, Senate Bill 1 was introduced to abolish COAH.105 The bill
was amended a number of times over the months to come.106 Around this time, at the executive
level, in February 2010, newly elected Governor Christie issued Executive Order No. 12, which
created the Housing Opportunity Task Force.107 He directed the task force to review existing
affordable housing laws and regulations, assess “the continued existence of COAH,” and issue a
report in 90 days, staying any pending COAH proceedings until the task force submitted its
report.108 In its report issued March 19, 2010, the task force concluded that in “the 25 years since
its creation, COAH has failed to recognize the significant changes in New Jersey environmental
awareness, transportation, population trends, and the economic climate.”109 The Task Force
determined that COAH was “irrevocably broken” and proposed a new model for affordable
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housing policy.110 Thereafter, although COAH’s statutory responsibilities remained unchanged,
the council was carefully monitored by the Governor’s office.111 As a result, it effectively
remained latent. This ultimately had a devastating effect on the implementation of affordable
housing throughout the state, because COAH took few, if any, significant actions.112
The lack of unity amongst the legislature became further apparent by June 2010, when one
version of the Senate 1 Bill passed the Senate, but did not reach enough support in the Assembly.113
However, during the summer and fall of 2010, “the Assembly leadership worked to craft an
alternative bill that would occupy a middle ground among the many different advocates and
interest groups.”114 A-3447, introduced in October 2010, attempted to provide a new method of
carrying out the Mount Laurel mandate.115

Also, during this time, the Appellate Division

concluded that COAH’s revised regulations suffered from “many of the same deficiencies as the
original third round rules,” and invalidated considerable parts of the second set of COAH’s Third
Round Rules.116 Again, the court remanded to COAH for the adoption of new Third Round Rules
and “specifically directed COAH to use a methodology for determining prospective need similar
to the methodologies used in the prior rounds.”117 Moreover, the court ordered COAH to complete
the task within five months.118

However, this was ignored by Governor Christie’s

administration.119
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Within three months, in January 2011, after some negotiations between the leadership of
the two houses, with minor modifications, A-3447 was substituted for S-1, and the bill passed both
houses on a party-line vote in January.120 Given COAH’s lack of successes, “it was now seen as
politically impossible to give any state agency the authority to impose or enforce fair share
obligations.”121 Nonetheless, A-3447 embraced a variation of the Massachusetts 40B model.122
Although the legislature finally achieved accord concerning affordable housing reform at
this point in time, the State still failed to achieve consensus at the executive level. Despite the
senate and assembly’s collaboration to achieve an agreement between the two houses, the
Governor conditionally vetoed the bill on January 25, 2011.123 His veto delineated particular
objections to the final bill and requested that it be amended to go back to the version that was
passed in the Senate on June 10, 2010.124 However, since the legislature was not willing to adopt
the changes demanded by the Governor, the bill died.125
By February 7, 2011, the bill was withdrawn from consideration in the Legislature. 126 It
became evident that despite close attempts, the branches of state government could not agree on a
new affordable housing policy, and as a result, the FHA and COAH remained intact.127 Since the
Bill under consideration died, COAH remained the sole Mount Laurel enforcement mechanism.
While the Appellate Division was willing to hold COAH accountable for its responsibilities, the
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executive branch treated it as a non-existent agency.128 In the meantime, the New Jersey Supreme
Court had agreed to take the appeals from the appellate division ruling overturning the COAH
rules.129
Roughly four months later, on June 29, 2011, the Governor issued Reorganization Plan No.
001-2011 (“The Plan”).130 The Governor’s Plan sought to abolish COAH and transfer its powers,
functions, and duties to Department of Community Affairs (DCA).131 Accordingly, it would
replace the twelve-member Council with the DCA Commissioner.132 Around this time, in 2012,
the DCA Commissioner, Richard E. Constable, prepared amendments that purported to define
when funds were considered as expended or committed for expenditure, pursuant to the FHA’s
2008 Amendment, after not being defined for four years.133 Such regulations were critical, since
the 2008 Amendment had provided that the municipality could not “spend or commit to spend”
any of the fees without first obtaining COAH’s approval of the expenditure, and added that any
developer fees collected, but not committed, for expenditure within four years from the date of the
collection would revert to the State’s “New Jersey Affordable Housing Trust Fund,” to be used in
the housing region of the transferring municipality for the authorized purposes of that fund. 134
However, Commissioner Constable’s amendments were never adopted.135 Thus, in their absence,
municipalities were left to their own devices to attempt to resolve the issue, but had little success.136
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Subsequently, on March 8, 2012, the Appellate Division invalidated Governor Christie’s
Plan to abolish COAH after the Fair Share Housing Center challenged the Reorganization Plan in
court.137 Shortly thereafter, despite the fact that legislation was passed that would have defined
what funds were “committed,” and therefore ineligible for transfer to the State, on June 29, 2012,
Christie vetoed the legislation and passed to extend the four-year deadline for two years.138
Moreover, Christie line-item vetoed language in the 2012-2013 budget which would have defined
what funds were “committed” and therefore ineligible for transfer to the State. 139 With that
proposed definitional language removed, the 2012 budget bill as signed into law provided that “an
amount not to exceed $200,000,000 from the municipal affordable housing trust funds and
transferred to the New Jersey Affordable Housing Trust Fund as funds that have not been
committed “shall be deposited in the General Fund as state revenue.”140 By July of 2012, the
Christie administration attempted to usurp nearly $200 million in trust funds set aside for
affordable housing, and place them into the State’s general fund.141 Hence, the millions of dollars
in fees accumulated over years, specifically devoted to affordable housing efforts, could essentially
be used for anything, but that for which they were intended. However, ultimately, that effort failed
because it was ruled unlawful by the Appellate Division.142
C. The Judiciary Re-Enters the Fray
In 2013, higher courts finally addressed issues relating to the lack of political consensus
that enabled delays for affordable housing.143 Specifically, in July 10, 2013, the New Jersey
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Supreme Court affirmed that the governor could not unilaterally abolish COAH. 144 Furthermore,
two months later, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision
invalidating the Third Round rules, and directed COAH to adopt new rules.145 Incorporating the
Appellate Division’s five-month compliance period, the new rules were to be created by February
26, 2014.146 However, the court granted COAH one last motion for an extension, subject to
specific conditions and this date was pushed back even further.147 COAH was to adopt the Third
Round Rules by October 22, and publish the notice in the November 17 edition of the New Jersey
Register.148
Ultimately, it became apparent that COAH did not approach this deadline. Although the
Board met and voted to propose COAH’s new Third Round Rules on April 30, 2014, the rules had
not been provided to the Board until roughly twenty-four hours before the meeting.149
Furthermore, its second meeting to vote on the proposed new Third Round Rules did not take place
until October 20, 2014, merely two days before the court’s extended deadline. At that meeting,
the COAH members split 3-3 on the vote, and the Third Round Rules were thus never adopted by
October 22 in accordance with the court's order.150
As a result of COAH’s studied inaction, in March 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that there was no longer a legitimate basis to block access to the courts with
respect to issues regarding the Mount Laurel mandate.151 Specifically, the court held that, “[t]he
FHA’s exhaustion-of-administrative remedies requirement, which states off civil actions, is
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premised on the existence of a functioning agency, not a moribund one.”152 The court recognized
that by failing to promulgate Third Round Rules after years of inaction, COAH was essentially
dilapidated. Jurisdiction over Mount Laurel affordable housing issues, therefore, would return the
courts as the first forum for redress. Particularly, the court held, “[p]arties concerned about
municipal compliance with constitutional affordable housing obligations are entitled to such
access, and municipalities that believe they are constitutionally compliant or that are ready and
willing to demonstrate such compliance should be able to secure declarations that their housing
plans and implementing ordinances are presumptively valid in the event they later must defend
against exclusionary zoning litigation.”153 Hence in an impartial fashion, the court was willing to
accommodate both municipalities and affordable housing advocates alike.
In order to establish an orderly method by which proceedings could commence and to allow
parties to prepare, the court delayed its order 120 days and established a transitional process.154
Under the process, after the first 90 days, municipalities would have 30 days to file declaratory
judgment actions before judges assigned in each vicinage.155 These declaratory judgment actions
would allow the municipalities to request immunity from lawsuits if they had already achieved
substantive certification, or already had “participating status” from COAH under the Third Round
Rules before they were invalidated.156 The judges’ evaluation of a town’s plan could then result
in what it referred to as “the town’s receipt of the judicial equivalent of substantive certification
and accompanying protection as provided under the FHA.”157 On the other hand, if towns chose
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not to file such actions within the time frame set by the New Jersey Supreme Court, an action could
be brought by a party against that municipality to determine whether its housing plan satisfied the
Mount Laurel mandate.158 The court thus made clear that any municipalities noncompliant with
the deadlines set forth would have clear consequences. Respectively, the following month, the
Appellate Division further clarified that the Christie administration could not take housing trust
funds and place them in the State’s general fund.159
Part IV: Why the Mount Laurel IV Decision Was Necessary
Ultimately, the Mount Laurel IV decision terminating any requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies before COAH for Mount Laurel compliance issues was necessary to serve
as an impetus for reform and to put an end to delays in the provision of affordable housing
opportunities throughout the State. It is evident that without political consensus and reform
legislation, affordable housing obligations are simply ignored absent court orders pushing the
process along. Inconsistencies at the State government level enable municipalities to employ pretextual methods to disregard the mandate. This is because the absence of clear governing standards
leaves local and county officials, respective in-house and outside professional staffs, litigators,
developers, builders, planners, local government attorneys, zoning, land use, and planning
attorneys, engineers, affordable housing advocates, and environmentalists with insufficient
guidance concerning how best to comply with the Mount Laurel mandate.160 Such lack of guidance
for all involved enables municipalities to exploit irregularities, rely on loopholes, and foster delay.
Specifically, absent political consensus and strict enforcement mechanisms, localities can be
creative in finding ways to avoid compliance, whether by routinely routinely requesting deadline
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extensions, hiring attorneys and experts skilled in avoidance tactics, and using environmental
preservation as a pre-text to skirt the Mount Laurel duty. Now that the judiciary has established
jurisdiction over Mount Laurel litigation in the first instance, those delay tactics are less likely to
succeed.
The present posture of allowing the judiciary to serve as the first forum for redress until
reform legislation is developed makes good sense. Otherwise, municipalities can to easily skirt
their affordable housing obligations by requesting extensions and adjournments. The Township
of Marlboro, for example, failed to act in good faith in the completion of its second-round
obligations and in its submissions for third-round certification by fashioning deferrals for years on
end.161 Particularly, the township fulfilled only about one-fifth of its 1019-unit second-round
obligation by obtaining numerous postponements throughout COAH’s review process.162
Moreover, during this time, Marlboro frequently shifted project sites to defer the process of
erecting affordable housing.163 Although COAH attempted to resolve this issue, its enforcement
was simply not effective. For example, COAH confronted the municipality by demanding further
information regarding its changes in affordable housing plans.164 However, the township was
ultimately able to escape these demands by simply requesting further postponements through the

See In Re Marlboro Township, Monmouth County, Motion Seeking Accelerated Denial of Marlboro’s Third
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administrative process.165 These extensions thus allowed Marlboro to perpetually postpone its
Mount Laurel obligations.
In addition, the frequent changes and inconsistencies at the state governmental level allow
municipalities to avoid their obligations, because townships’ attorneys are able to use the lack of
political consensus as a defense when townships are challenged for engaging in dilatory behavior.
For example, when various developers filed a motion to dismiss Marlboro from COAH’s
jurisdiction after years of noncompliance, the township not only opposed the application and
requested additional extensions, but also attributed its delay to “factors beyond its control, such as
the Governor’s executive order suspending COAH’s operations, appeals challenging the thirdround regulations, and the introduction of legislative proposals designed to alter the affordable
housing laws.”166 While it was apparent that the municipality had no intention or drive to satisfy
its affordable housing obligations, it was able to mask its failure to do so and gain more time by
using the state government’s inaction to its advantage.167
Moreover, the Mount Laurel IV decision was necessary, because without judicial
intervention, municipalities can too easily create the illusion of compliance. For example, a
township could enact a set of ordinances that do make provision for affordable units, but never act
upon those ordinances. For instance, in 2011, the Fair Share Housing Center sued the Hoboken
Zoning Board and four developers for failing to enforce a local housing ordinance with provisions
that require residential developers to devote a certain percentage of new units for “working
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families, seniors and those with disabilities.”168 The Appellate Division ultimately agreed with
the Fair Share Housing Center and upheld the ordinance, which compelled developers in the city
to make ten percent of new units affordable to lower-income families. However, the decision was
not rendered until July of 2015, roughly twenty-seven years after the ordinance was signed into
law in 1988.169
Furthermore, it is imperative to allow the judiciary to serve as the first forum for redress,
because in the midst of the political confusion surrounding the Mount Laurel doctrine, and absent
reform legislation, municipalities can abuse proposals for environmental preservation efforts as a
pretext to continue exclusionary practices.170 In Mount Laurel II, the court specifically held that
“the Mount Laurel Doctrine will not restrict other measures, including large-lot and open area
zoning, that would maintain its beauty and communal character.”171 The court thus implemented
affordable housing obligations while accounting for environmental conservation proposals.
However, one study revealed, “municipalities are targeting land able to accommodate higherdensity development in their preservation efforts, and that municipalities that preserve open space
are also active in transferring away their affordable housing obligations.” 172 This indicates that
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without strict oversight, and under relaxed “enforcement” regimes like COAH, towns can employ
environmental preservation plans as a way to curtail affordable housing obligations. In Toll Bros.
v. Twp. Of W. Windsor, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
decision granting a builder’s remedy when a township established ordinances to set aside an
excessive amount of common open and recreational space and the sites zoned for affordable
housing had severe environmental constraints including “freshwater wetlands, freshwater wetlands
buffers, and floodplain plain areas.”173

The township also set unduly expensive sewerage

requirements that made development unlikely.174 Moreover, it did not authorize the building of
modest one-family detached dwellings, or the building of modest one-family detached
dwellings.175 The court found that the township failed to provide a reasonable opportunity for the
development of affordable housing and did not built the units of affordable housing to which it
committed.176
Similarly, in Tomu Dev. Co. v. Borough of Carlstadt, zoning boards did not satisfy their
affordable housing obligations arguing that the land had no realistic development potential.177
However, the Appellate Division ultimately affirmed that the municipality could not even meet its
burden of proving that the site for development was environmentally constrained or that
construction would represent bad planning.178 It found that East Rutherford made no good faith
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effort to submit a compliant housing element, as the site appeared to be one of the few remaining
developable housing sites in the two municipalities.179 The Appellate Court also notably upheld
the trial judge’s decision to, for the first time ever, create an additional new mechanism to ensure
compliance by the defendant towns as an aide to its award of a “builder’s remedy.”180 Specifically,
a new “‘Mt. Laurel Implementation Monitor’ was appointed by the court to perform pertinent
zoning functions of the towns such as making land use development decisions for them, preparing
housing elements and fair share plans and appearing before the NJMC on affordable housing
applications.”181 All zoning ordinances in both Carlstadt and East Rutherford were suspended
pending their compliance with the remedy.182
While the court ultimately held in favor of the implementation of affordable housing in
both Toll Bros. and Tomu Dev. Co., it is important to allow the judiciary to serve as the initial
forum for redress until effective reform legislation can be passed. Otherwise, attempts at securing
compliance with the affordable housing mandate would be needlessly protracted. For example,
previously aggrieved developers had to comply with COAH’s own procedures before being
granted judicial review.

Those procedures presented multiple opportunities for delay and

obfuscation. For instance, in In Re Marlboro, the court held, “COAH gave Marlboro years of
opportunities to perfect its plans. That Marlboro chose not to do so triggered the consequences it

Id. at *18. The lower court’s opinion thus stated that the land use regulations of the municipalities remained
invalid and unconstitutional insofar as they continued past exclusionary practices and the Meadowlands Commission
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at *3.
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now faces.”183 Although the court held that “Mount Laurel issues were best addressed before a
judge, as Marlboro simply failed to engage in the alternative process in good faith,” it was not until
many years later that the Court actually got to address the issue.184 These were years that could
have been spent erecting affordable housing units for people in need.
Moreover, this lengthy process deters people from pursuing litigation because the amount
of time and money expended on such can be rendered worthless if the litigation us unsuccessful.
For example, in Mount Olive Complex v. Township of Mount Olive, although Mount Laurel issues
were finally dealt with before the judiciary, the court ultimately affirmed the denial of a builder’s
remedy.185 The Appellate Division concluded that it did not appear that completion of the
proposed project would significantly impact the availability of affordable housing in the
township.186 Specifically, it affirmed that the developer was not a “major player” in an earlier
settlement and could not demonstrate that Mount Olive’s land-use regulations failed to provide a
realistic opportunity to satisfy its obligation at the time the developer brought its litigation.187
Although the developer exhausted significant time and money to pursue litigation, its efforts were
fruitless. As a result, many of the aggrieved simply do not litigate. John Mangin, an attorney who
worked for the Fair Share Housing Development, explained that, “[s]uburban municipalities will
baldly reject conforming applications for multifamily affordable development, knowing that
applicants will most likely not be able to carry a property though a drawn-out legal battle.”188
Furthermore, he states, “[a]nd while the remedy in a successful NIMBY suit is a blocked
development, the remedy in a successful developer suit is typically the privilege of starting the
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costly approvals process all over again. Delay can kill projects outright if carry costs become too
burdensome. The developer loses the property or simply gives up.”189 Thus, from the perspective
of developers, the costs of delay can simply outweigh any benefits of building affordable housing.
Conversely, by terminating any requirement to first exhaust administrative remedies before
COAH, the problem of delays in affordable housing can be averted. The Mount Laurel IV decision
serves not as a punishment, but rather, a means by which towns can demonstrate their
constitutional compliance.190 Moreover, it acts as an impetus for reform in affordable housing
legislation. While the judiciary took control of Mount Laurel compliance issues, the court held,
“nothing herein should be understood to prevent COAH from fulfilling its statutory mission to
adopt constitutional rules to govern municipalities’ Third Round obligations in compliance with
the FHA.”191 Nevertheless, until constitutional rules or more effective legislation is developed,
the Mount Laurel IV decision has acted to end delays in the implementation of affordable housing.
By allowing the judiciary to serve as a forum of initial redress, clearer guidelines regarding
the Mount Laurel mandate have already emerged to avert postponement on the part of
municipalities. For example, within a few short months of the decision, in July of 2015, Superior
Court Judge Douglas K. Wolfson clarified the steps that need to be taken by municipalities in order
to comply with Mount Laurel.192 The decision provided a roadmap for compliance and illustrated
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that the judiciary acts as an impartial referee when addressing affordable housing issues. It allotted
the municipality, Monroe Township, ample time to file a fair share plan while also setting a firm
deadline of November 9, 2015.193 Moreover, it stressed that all interested parties would have the
opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the Judge permitted a developer and the Fair Share Housing
Center to participate in the lawsuit.194
Furthermore, by giving specially assigned judges jurisdiction over all affordable housing
litigation in the first instance, municipalities can no longer snub their affordable housing
obligations by requesting extensions and adjournments. The judicial branch has made clear that
such attempts will no longer be tolerated. For instance, even though Judge Wolfson’s decision
clearly set out a roadmap for municipalities for filing a fair share plan, the Borough of Roselle
Park nevertheless filed a motion to request that the five-month period begin on an undecided future
date.195 However, this delay tactic was quickly eliminated. When the FSHC opposed the request,
it was able to quickly and efficiently obtain an order granting immunity and declaring that the five
months would begin when the municipality filed in court. 196
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Moreover, by allowing the judiciary to serve as the first forum for redress, Judges have
been able to quickly make innovative decisions to promote the building of affordable housing.
Particularly, in Middlesex County, Judge Wolfson continues to rapidly address Mount Laurel
issues. In September of 2015, for example, he held that municipalities “proceeding in good faith”
to accomplish judicial consent of their affordable housing plans will have their housing trust funds
safeguarded from state seizure.197 Since Monroe Township, collected over ten million dollars in
its housing trust fund, the decision is likely to have a significant impact on future housing
development projects.198
In October of 2015, Judge Wolfson issued another noteworthy decision that accounted for
the sixteen-year delay in the adoption of fair housing rules.199 The decision is binding on
Middlesex County and follows an approach that divides the State’s housing need into two
segments.200 Specifically, from 1999 to 2015, excess Prior Round credits can be applied so that
affordable housing need from the 16-year gap is addressed first.201 The resulting need will then
be phased in three ten-year cycles, over thirty years.202 Although, under the FHA, a municipality
may be eligible for a one thousand unit cap limiting fair housing obligations, this determination
would be made separately for the 2015-2025 segment, after any remaining excess Prior Round
credits are applied.203 Thus, the longwinded sixteen-year delay in affordable housing is accounted
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for.204 The decision, which is the first to address this issue, proves that the judiciary is committed
to holding municipalities accountable for their Mount Laurel obligations.205
Part V: Conclusion
Ultimately, despite the challenges it has faced, the Mount Laurel mandate remains a most
hopeful mechanism by which to make real the promise of decent housing for all.206 It is evident,
however, that the judiciary has its work cut out for it in arriving at stricter and more cohesive
enforcement mechanisms than those set out by COAH. Indeed, COAH and the coordinating
branches object failure yielded inescapable the conclusion that the judiciary had to enter the fray.
It will remain there until the legislative and executive branches can develop legislation that
effectively addresses the affordable housing crisis. Until then, however, the judicial branch is
needed to compel relief that will unquestionably have a meaningful impact on affordable housing
reform in New Jersey. Today, New Jersey remains one of the most economically and racially
segregated states in America notwithstanding the Mount Laurel mandate.207 The judiciary can
spur meaningful change by implementing the spirit and letter of the affordable housing mandate.
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